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Incidental Burdens and the Nature of
Judicial Review
A Response to Joseph Blocher and Darrell A.H. Miller,
What Is Gun Control? Direct Burdens, Incidental Burdens, and
the Boundariesof the Second Amendment,
83 U Chi L Rev 295 (2016).
Michael C. Dorft

INTRODUCTION

Professors Joseph Blocher and Darrell Miller deserve enormous credit for identifying a heretofore largely unrecognized
problem. They explain that common-law doctrines and general
statutes that are not instances of conventional gun control can
nonetheless be applied in ways that limit the freedom to own, possess, and use firearms.I They ask: "Does the Second Amendment
apply to civil suits for trespass, negligence, and nuisance? Does
the Amendment cover gun-neutral laws of general applicability
like assault and disturbing the peace?"2 More broadly, should the
application of such doctrines and laws trigger Second Amendment
scrutiny? Blocher and Miller offer a framework for thinking about
an important set of unresolved questions.
Blocher and Miller accomplish three goals: (1) they demonstrate the scope of the problem by identifying a wide range of
doctrines and laws that could be said to infringe the Second
Amendment, depending on how the courts approach incidental
burdens;3 (2) they list and elaborate factors that could be used to

t Robert S. Stevens Professor of Law, Cornell University Law School. Emily Rector
provided excellent research assistance.
1 See Joseph Blocher and Darrell A.H. Miller, What Is Gun Control?Direct Burdens,
Incidental Burdens, and the Boundaries of the Second Amendment, 83 U Chi L Rev 295,
303-04 (2016). I refer to "firearms" (or sometimes "guns") as the objects protected by the
Second Amendment, because most cases involving the Amendment involve firearms. By
this shorthand, I do not mean to take a position on what other arms it protects. See
Caetano uMassachusetts, No 14-10078, slip opinion at 1-2 (US Mar 21, 2016) (per curiam)
(reversing a state court's determination that stun guns are not protected, as its reasoning
was inconsistent with District of Columbia u Heller, 554 US 570 (2008), without deciding
whether the Second Amendment protects stun guns).
2 Blocher and Miller, 83 U Chi L Rev at 295 (cited in note 1).
3 Id at 303-23.
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sort between incidental burdens that trigger Second Amendment
scrutiny and those that do not;4 and (3) they describe various purposes that the Second Amendment might serve, because they understand that the question whether any particular doctrine or law
should be understood to infringe the Second Amendment is partly
a normative question that cannot be answered without reference
to the Amendment's purposes.5
Blocher and Miller also shed new light on the general relation
between rights and rules. Their analysis has potential implications for legal doctrines concerning incidental burdens on other
rights, such as religion, speech, and equal protection. Their analysis also could bear on doctrines that they do not discuss, such as
when litigants can succeed in facial challenges to the constitutionality of laws. Most fundamentally, Blocher and Miller point to a
gap in constitutional law and legal theory: we do not have a good
account of what constitutes a "law" that might infringe a right.
This Essay has three goals of its own. Part I is a compliment
disguised as a quibble. In responding to Blocher and Miller's characterization of my own analysis of incidental burdens, I note that
their article is an important contribution to the literature on the
Second Amendment as a whole, not just incidental burdens
thereon. Part II notes an important distinction between other
rights that might be incidentally burdened by general laws-especially speech, religion, and equal protection-and the Second
Amendment right to own, possess, and use firearms. Each of the
former has a strong equality component. That difference might
lead one to conclude that direct burdens on these other rights
ought to trigger greater scrutiny than direct burdens on Second
Amendment rights. Part III explains how Blocher and Miller have
identified what ought to be, but is not yet, a central concern of
jurisprudence: when and how to pick out a particular legal obligation from the entire legal corpus and call that particular obligation a distinct law.
I. DIRECT BURDENS ON SECOND AMENDMENT RIGHTS
Professors Blocher and Miller build on an article I wrote
about incidental burdens two decades ago. There, I argued that
laws that do not target fundamental constitutional rights can

4
5

Id at 323-47.
Id at 347-54.
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nonetheless seriously infringe such rights in particular circumstances.6 I proposed that, in general, even such formally rightsneutral laws ought to be subjected to heightened scrutiny when
they impose substantial incidental burdens on fundamental
rights.7 I am grateful to Blocher and Miller for characterizing my
article as "insightful."8 However, I quibble with their contention
that my favored approach runs counter to the Supreme Court's
treatment of incidental burdens on Second Amendment rights
when those burdens are supported by history and tradition9
My proposed framework was not simply a substantiality
threshold. I also conceded that any sensible approach to incidental burdens can be only partly trans substantive. How far to go
in protecting rights against incidental burdens, I wrote, will "require substantive interpretation of the relevant constitutional
rights."10 Blocher and Miller make the same point. They explain
that whether any particular incidental burden on an asserted Second Amendment right ought to trigger Second Amendment scrutiny should depend on the underlying purpose(s) of the Second
Amendment."

Moreover, my argument was largely normative. I recognized
that positive law in the areas I analyzed-speech, religion, and
equality-did not fully conform to my proposed framework. 12 The
fact that the Second Amendment doctrine propounded in District
of Columbia v Hellerl3 also does not fully fit the framework I proposed does not show that the framework is normatively mistaken.
Even as a purely descriptive matter, Heller cannot contradict
my approach because Heller involved a direct burden, not an incidental one. In providing assurances that ostensibly "longstanding" regulations of firearms would remain valid, the Court clearly
had in mind direct regulations of firearms possession as such. 14

6
See Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on FundamentalRights, 109 Harv L Rev
1175, 1176-79 (1996) ("[L]aws having the incidental effect of substantially burdening fundamental rights to engage in primary conduct should be subject to heightened scrutiny.").
7 See id at 1232-33.
8
Blocher and Miller, 83 U Chi L Rev at 340 (cited in note 1).
9 See id at 339.
10 Dorf, 109 Harv L Rev at 1251 (cited in note 6).
11 Blocher and Miller, 83 U Chi L Rev at 340, 347-55 (cited in note 1).
12 See Dorf, 109 Harv L Rev at 1232-33, 1251 (cited in note 6) (acknowledging that
the relevant case law was "riddled with inconsistencies and exceptions").
13 554 US 570 (2008).
14 See id at 626-27 (disclaiming any intention "to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the
carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws
imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms").
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Blocher and Miller make an important point in observing that incidental burdens on Second Amendment rights that arise from
the application of longstanding common-law doctrines might similarly be treated as triggering no Second Amendment scrutiny in
virtue of the history and tradition of these common-law doctrines.
But that observation does not contradict the framework I offered
twenty years ago, because it is not an observation about incidental burdens as such. If the pedigree of a restriction means that
the right it is alleged to infringe "just does not show Up," 15 then
the right does not show up for direct or incidental burdens.
Putting aside my own defense,16 note how much of what
Blocher and Miller have to say bears on direct burdens on Second
Amendment rights. In articulating the uneasy role of history and
tradition in validating exceptions to the Second Amendment, they
speak to the kinds of direct burdens most likely to be challenged
on Second Amendment grounds-laws restricting who may possess firearms17 and putting certain places off-limits to those who
possess firearms.18

Likewise, the choice among various rationales for the Second
Amendment right will have implications for the validity of direct
burdens on the Second Amendment. For example, Blocher and
Miller suggest that notwithstanding the Supreme Court's focus
on individual self-defense in Heller and McDonald v City of
Chicago, Illinois,19 the insurrectionist justification for the Second
Amendment remains viable.20 That suggestion runs counter to
15 Blocher and Miller, 83 U Chi L Rev at 296 (cited in note 1), quoting Frederick
Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A PreliminaryExploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 Harv L Rev 1765, 1769 (2004).
16 Perhaps my response is overly defensive. Blocher and Miller say only that treating
even very substantial incidental burdens on Second Amendment rights as triggering no
Second Amendment scrutiny "seems to run counter to the approach" I proposed. Blocher
and Miller, 83 U Chi L Rev at 339 (cited in note 1).
17 See, for example, United States v Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F3d 664, 673 (7th Cir 2015)
(upholding a statute prohibiting firearms possession by undocumented immigrants);
United States v Yancey, 621 F3d 681, 687 (7th Cir 2010) (upholding a statute prohibiting
possession of a firearm by unlawful drug users); United States v Skoien, 614 F3d 638, 639,
645 (7th Cir 2010) (en banc) (upholding a statute forbidding persons convicted of a domestic violence misdemeanor from possessing firearms, as applied to a recidivist who had been
arrested for possessing guns while on probation).
18 See, for example, Bonidy v United States Postal Service, 790 F3d 1121, 1122-23,
1129 (10th Cir 2015) (upholding a regulation prohibiting firearms on USPS property);
GeorgiaCarry.org,Inc v Georgia, 687 F3d 1244, 1248-49, 1264 (11th Cir 2012) (upholding
a firearms restriction in places of worship); Nordyke v King, 681 F3d 1041, 1044 (9th Cir
2012) (en banc) (upholding an ordinance prohibiting possession of firearms on county
property).
19 561 US 742 (2010).
20 Blocher and Miller, 83 U Chi L Rev at 350-52 (cited in note 1).
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conventional wisdom, which holds that the militia movement in
the 1990s discredited insurrectionism.21 Yet the suggestion is
plausible and, if the insurrectionist strand of Second Amendment
theory were accepted by the courts, could have important doctrinal consequences.
Consider laws restricting the number of firearms an individual may own, possess, or purchase.22 If the Second Amendment
serves to protect only a right of individual self-defense, then numerical limits are likely valid. A person does not need more than
one or two firearms to defend herself. However, if the Second
Amendment serves insurrectionist purposes, then it arguably
protects a right to stockpile weapons for a confrontation with the
government.
I do not mean to suggest that the Second Amendment should
be construed to protect a right to insurrection, or that even if one
acknowledges its insurrectionist roots one must also concede that
any particular laws limiting the stockpiling of weapons should be
held unconstitutional. Nor do Blocher and Miller. My point here
is simply this: their observation that the purpose(s) served by the
Second Amendment affects how the Amendment should be construed is at least as important for the analysis of direct burdens
as for the analysis of incidental ones.
II. DOES THE SECOND AMENDMENT HAVE AN EQUALITY
COMPONENT?

Professors Blocher and Miller chiefly bill their article as a
contribution to the literature on incidental burdens, and it is a
major one. They explicitly raise important questions about when
the application of firearms-neutral common-law doctrines and
statutes could be regarded as infringing Second Amendment
rights.23 If, say, a law requiring bullets to be stored separately
from guns implicates the Second Amendment, then perhaps the
application of a general negligence principle to impose liability on
a gun owner for death or injury caused by leaving his gun unsecured also implicates the Second Amendment. At least when the
same act-storing a loaded gun, in this example-gives rise to liability, there is some need to explain why it matters whether that
21 See, for example, Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 Harv L Rev 191, 226-32 (2008).
22 See, for example, Md Pub Safety Code Ann § 5-128(b) (permitting each individual
only one firearm purchase every thirty days); NJ Stat Ann § 2C:58-3(i) (permitting each
individual only one handgun purchase every thirty days).
23 Blocher and Miller, 83 U Chi L Rev at 303-23 (cited in note 1).
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liability arises out of a firearm-specific rather than a firearmneutral law or doctrine. After all, from the gun owner's perspective, the consequences are the same. Indeed, depending on the
size and nature of liability, the incidental burden may be more
substantial than the direct one. 2 4

A. Floodgates
Why, then, do most direct burdens on rights automatically
trigger judicial scrutiny, whereas the application of judicial scrutiny based on incidental burdens is controversial? As I have previously noted, one answer is "a floodgates concern. Nearly every
law will, in some circumstances, impose an incidental burden on
some right."25 Accordingly, the Supreme Court has sometimes offered the fear of litigation as a reason to disregard incidental burdens on rights.
For example, in justifying the proposition that disparate impact on members of a racial minority group does not by itself constitute a prima facie equal protection violation, the Court in
Washington v Davis26 worried that a contrary rule "would be far
reaching and would raise serious questions about, and perhaps
invalidate, a whole range of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and licensing statutes."27 Likewise, in treating incidental
burdens on the free exercise of religion as not implicating the
First Amendment in the 1990 peyote case, the Court worried that
a contrary rule "would open the prospect of constitutionally required religious exemptions from civic obligations of almost every
conceivable kind."28

Yet the claim that treating incidental burdens on constitutional rights as infringing those rights will lead to a flood of litigation is empirical. The claim may or may not be true in different
contexts. Moreover, the floodgates claim is falsifiable. In both the
equal protection and the free exercise contexts we have statutory

24 See Dorf, 109 Harv L Rev at 1177 (cited in note 6) ("Direct burdens can be trivialfor example, a one-penny tax on newspapers that publish editorials critical of the government-whereas conversely, incidental burdens can be extremely harsh-for example, applying a prohibition against wearing headgear in the military to an Orthodox Jew.").
25 Id at 1178.
26 426 US 229 (1976).
27 Id at 248.
28 Employment Division, Departmentof Human Resources of Oregon v Smith, 494 US
872, 888 (1990).
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regimes that take incidental burdens seriously.29 The courts have
not been overrun with such claims.
To be sure, recent cases involving religious exceptions are
controversial. However, the controversy mostly concerns how
broadly or narrowly to construe religious freedom and what
counts as a compelling interest. Should corporations be able to
assert religious freedom claims, as the Supreme Court held in
Burwell v Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc?30 Do religious claimants make
out prima facie claims that their religious exercise is "substantially burden[ed]" merely by asserting that compliance with a law
would be sinful, as the plaintiffs in Zubik v Burwell3i argued?32 Do
states and localities have a compelling interest in combating antiLGBTQ discrimination sufficient to override the state religious
freedom claims of bakers, photographers, and florists? In none of
these examples is the main argument for striking the balance
against the claim of religious freedom a concern about the volume
of litigation. Accordingly, skepticism about broad protection for
religious freedom against incidental burdens does not vindicate
the floodgates concern as such.
The floodgates concern is not necessarily trivial, but it is
merely one factor that courts and legislators could legitimately
consider in deciding whether and how to recognize any particular
right against incidental burdens. The risk of a flood of litigation
does not warrant the sorts of categorical dismissals of incidental
burden claims that sometimes appear in the case law.
B. Direct Burdens and Singling Out
If not floodgates, then what justifies treating incidental burdens differently from direct burdens? In some areas the doctrine
could be driven by the view that direct burdens pose the special
29 The Court in Davis acknowledged the disparate impact test for statutory claims of
employment discrimination under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, but declined to
treat the Constitution as requiring the same approach. Davis, 426 US at 246-48. Congress
responded to the Smith decision with the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993
(RFRA), Pub L No 103-141, 107 Stat 1488, codified at 42 USC § 2000bb et seq, and twentyone states have similar regimes. See Sophia Martin Schechner, Note, Religion'sPower over
Reproductive Care: State Religious Freedom Restoration Laws and Abortion, 22 Cardozo J
L & Gender 395, 397, 406 (2016).
30 134 S Ct 2751, 2785 (2014) (holding that a government mandate, "as applied to
closely held corporations, violates RFRA").
31 Nos 14-1418, 14-1453, 14-1505, 15-35, 15-105, 15-119, and 15-191, slip op (US May
16, 2016).
32 See Reply Brief of Petitioners, Southern Nazarene University v Burwell, No 15119, *1 (US filed Oct 13, 2015) (available on Westlaw at 2015 WL 6083219) (consolidated
with Zubik).
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harm of singling out. This harm is easiest to perceive in equal
protection cases. By its very nature, an equality claim asserts that
some burden or benefit has been distributed unevenly. In the
equal protection context, incidental burden claims are disparate
impact claims. When the courts reject disparate impact as the basis for equal protection liability, they reason that a law with a
disparate impact does not, simply by virtue of the disparate impact, single people out based on an illicit criterion. A successful
equal protection claim requires showing that the government's
adoption of a policy disadvantaging a particular group was "because of, not merely in spite of, its adverse effects upon" that
group. 33
One can disagree with the constitutional doctrine refusing to
treat disparate impact as itself actionable, yet still recognize the
force of the Court's point: there is something especially unequal
about being singled out on the basis of an illicit trait. Singling out
is, to paraphrase Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, more like being
kicked than being stumbled over. 34
Free speech and religious freedom also have equality components that make singling out especially problematic. The equality
component of free speech cashes out doctrinally via the stringent
scrutiny that applies to content-based35 and, especially,
viewpoint-based limits on speech. 36 Indeed, even laws that target
expression on a content-neutral basis are as problematic as potential censorship. Thus, a tax that applies only to newspapers
(or their electronic equivalent) is not considered an incidental

burden.37
Likewise, for religion, even as the Court construed free exercise in the peyote case to exclude incidental burdens, it promised
that discriminationon the basis of religion would be deemed unconstitutional. 38 True to their word, three years later the justices

33 Personnel Administratorof Massachusettsv Feeney, 442 US 256, 279 (1979) (quotation marks omitted).
34 O.W. Holmes Jr, The Common Law 3 (Little, Brown 1881).
35 See Brown v EntertainmentMerchants Association, 564 US 786, 799 (2011).
36 Even in a limited public forum, the government may not discriminate based on
viewpoint. See Rosenberger v Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia, 515 US 819,
825-26, 829 (1995) (holding that a university could not withhold student activity funds
based on a student group's religious speech).
37 See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co v Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue, 460
US 575, 579 (1983) (holding that a tax on ink and paper used in periodicals violated freedom of the press protections).
38 See Smith, 494 US at 878.
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unanimously invoked free exercise to invalidate a law that discriminated on religious grounds.39 Despite continuing contestation over numerous questions about the proper scope of religious
liberty, there is little doubt that it has a strong equality component. The contest is entirely over what else religious liberty
requires.
C. Singling Out Guns
What about Second Amendment rights? Gun regulation is a
wedge issue in contemporary American politics and constitutional
law. Gun regulations disproportionately impact "white, male, and
rural" 40 Americans who regard such regulations as a targeted attack on their way of life. Yet despite occasional unfortunate political rhetoric that may reflect negative stereotypes of gun owners, 41
Blocher and Miller are surely correct to discount the notion that
laws regulating guns can be attributed to "hatred of guns" or "bigotry" against people who own, possess, or use guns. 42 Indeed, even
a gun-rights advocate concedes that many legislators who vote to
enact gun control measures do not do so because they "hate guns
and gun owners."43
Moreover, even if some gun regulations were, in fact, rooted
in attitudes nurtured by the culture wars, that would only indicate that those regulations might be invalidated on equal protection grounds as based on impermissible "animus."44 Proving that
bias against gun owners underwrites gun regulations would
hardly show that a purpose of the Second Amendment is to protect
against animus directed at gun owners in the way that equal

39 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc v City of Hialeah, 508 US 520, 523-24
(1993) (striking down city ordinances that prohibited animal sacrifice because they targeted members of a Santeria church).
40 Michael C. Dorf, Identity Politics and the Second Amendment, 73 Fordham L Rev
549, 552 (2004).
41 See Jeff Zeleny, Obama Slams Critics onMiddle-Class Comments (NY Times, Apr
11, 2008), online at http://nyti.ms/2cO983X (visited Sept 17, 2016) (Perma archive unavailable) (quoting then-Senator Barack Obama stating that "bitter," working class, white voters "cling to guns").
42 Blocher and Miller, 83 U Chi L Rev at 346 & nn 287-88 (cited in note 1), citing
Nicholas J. Johnson, A Second Amendment Moment: The ConstitutionalPolitics of Gun
Control, 71 Brooklyn L Rev 715, 795 (2005) (discussing hatred of guns), and quoting David
B. Kopel, The First Amendment Guide to the Second Amendment, 81 Tenn L Rev 417,
462 (2014).
43 Kopel, 81 Tenn L Rev at 462 (cited in note 42) (conceding that members of Congress "who hate guns and gun owners" are a "minority").
44 Romer v Evans, 517 US 620, 632 (1996). But see id at 652 (Scalia dissenting) (accusing the majority of "tak[ing] sides in the culture wars").
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treatment of different viewpoints and religions are among the respective purposes of free speech and free exercise of religion.
Accordingly, Second Amendment rights differ from the rights
to equal protection, free speech, and religious freedom. Whereas
an equality component of each of the latter three rights justifies
treating direct burdens on those rights as more serious than incidental burdens, the Second Amendment lacks an equality component that makes direct burdens on Second Amendment rights inherently more problematic than incidental burdens.
However, it does not follow that incidental burdens on Second
Amendment rights must be treated identically to direct burdens.
The contrast between equal protection, free speech, religious freedom, and, alternatively, gun rights, shows that direct burdens on
the former are extra problematic in a way that direct burdens on
gun rights are not; it does not reveal that incidental burdens on
gun rights are more problematic than incidental burdens on the
other rights.
Contrasting incidental burdens on gun rights with incidental
burdens on other rights thus leads to the conclusion that perhaps
even direct burdens on Second Amendment rights should be
judged under a relatively permissive standard. In contrast with
direct burdens on other rights-which pose the special problem of
singling out-there is no special problem of singling out guns.
If that conclusion is correct, we may have reason to doubt a
seemingly central premise of the incipient Second Amendment
case law-namely, that Second Amendment rights should be
modeled on First Amendment rights. "Throughout the Heller majority opinion, the First Amendment is invoked as the gold standard of constitutional interpretation. The Court rejects any argument for construing the Second Amendment that would be
rejected if applied analogously to the .

.

. First Amendment."45 If

the analogy fails, however, direct burdens on Second Amendment
rights could survive when seemingly parallel burdens on First
Amendment rights would not.
Consider how such an approach would work in practice. Laws
that target speech or religion generally trigger heightened judicial scrutiny regardless of how substantially they burden speech
or religion. By contrast, if targeting is not a special concern of the
Second Amendment, then even a law that targets firearms for

45 Michael C. Dorf, Does Heller Protect a Right to Carry Guns outside the Home?, 59
Syracuse L Rev 225, 234 (2008) (citation omitted).
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regulation would not trigger heightened scrutiny unless it substantially burdened the right to possess firearms. For example,
whereas a special tax on the press is presumptively invalid, perhaps a special tax on guns (to fund medical care for victims of gun
violence, say) would be valid-indeed, would not even trigger Second Amendment scrutiny-if the tax were not so burdensome as
to render guns effectively unavailable for substantial numbers of
people.46 If singling out guns is different from singling out speech,
religion, or some personal characteristic that is problematic as a
matter of equal protection, then perhaps Second Amendment doctrine should reflect that fact.
I advance this hypothesis tentatively. Maybe there is some
reason to treat the singling out of guns as problematic. Or maybe
the Second Amendment is a kind of structural provision, so that
any law targeting guns automatically triggers Second Amendment scrutiny. If someone can justify treating direct burdens on
Second Amendment rights just like direct burdens on First
Amendment and equal protection rights, the courts should pay
attention. For now, though, Blocher and Miller have called attention to the need for such a justification.

III. WHERE DOES ONE LAW END AND THE NEXT ONE BEGIN?
Professors Blocher and Miller implicitly raise another issue
with implications beyond the Second Amendment or incidental
burdens more generally. By calling attention to the possibility
that the application of the general common law of negligence or
property to a case involving firearms could implicate the Second
Amendment, Blocher and Miller reveal a gap in the conventional
account of constitutional adjudication. We think we know what
we mean when we say that a law is unconstitutional, but pressing
harder reveals confusion and uncertainty about what we mean by
"a law."
A. As-Applied Targeting
The problem is not limited to common-law cases. Consider
the Supreme Court's 2010 decision in Holder v Humanitarian

46 For present purposes, it is not necessary to be more specific about what regulations
would or would not cross this threshold. One approach could model the test after the "undue burden" standard in the abortion context. See Whole Woman's Health V Hellerstedt,
136 S Ct 2292, 2309 (2016) (noting that in evaluating abortion restrictions, courts should
"consider the burdens a law imposes on abortion access together with the benefits those
laws confer").
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Law Project47 ("HLP"). Because that ruling ultimately upheld the
application of a federal law forbidding material support for terrorism to organizations that sought to provide groups deemed terrorists with training in how to advance their causes peacefully, 48
civil libertarians criticized it as insufficiently protective of
speech.49 Yet before its speech-restrictive conclusion, Chief Justice John Roberts made an analytical move that has potentially
far-reaching, speech-protective implications in distinguishing between content-based restrictions on speech and mere incidental
burdens. He wrote for the Court:
The Government argues that [the material aid statute]
should [ ] receive intermediate scrutiny because it generally
functions as a regulation of conduct. That argument runs
headlong into a number of our precedents, most prominently
Cohen v. California. [That case] also involved a generally applicable regulation of conduct, barring breaches of the peace.
But when Cohen was convicted for wearing a jacket bearing
[the phrase "fuck the draft"], we did not apply [intermediate
scrutiny]. Instead, we recognized that the generally applicable law was directed at Cohen because of what his speech
communicated-he violated the breach of the peace statute
because of the offensive content of his particular message. We
accordingly applied more rigorous scrutiny and reversed his
conviction.50

No justice dissented from this view in HLP. The dissenters
thought the law content-based as applied, but they thought that
it failed strict scrutiny.51 The justices unanimously adopted an asapplied approach to defining content-based regulations.52 Yet absent further clarification, that approach is highly problematic.
Imagine a statute that makes someone guilty of murder if he
"intentionally causes the death of another human being without
justification or excuse." Suppose that a mob boss is accused of
murdering a rival by instructing his henchman as follows: "Make
47 561 US 1 (2010).
48 Id at 7-8, 40.
49 See generally, for example, Robert William Canoy Jr, Note, Think before You
Speak: Holderv. Humanitarian Law Project-The Terrorists StoleMy Freedom of Speech!,
31 Miss Coll L Rev 155 (2012).
50 HLP, 561 US at 27-28 (citations omitted). See also Cohen u California, 403 US 15,
16 (1971).
51 HLP, 561 US at 41 (Breyer dissenting).
52 See id at 27-28; id at 41 (Breyer dissenting).
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sure that Eddie sleeps with the fishes." The henchman then kills
Eddie and dumps his body in the river. Does the mob boss have a
free speech defense to murder? Under the HLP formulation, apparently so: the murder law may be described as directed at the
conduct of murder, but as applied to the mob boss, the conduct
triggering coverage under the statute consists of communicating
a message. It seems wrong to subject the murder law to strict
scrutiny, yet the unanimous agreement that the application of the
material support statute as applied in HLP is content-based logically entails strict scrutiny in the prosecution of the mob boss for
murder as well.
Can we avoid that implication? The murder law will undoubtedly survive strict scrutiny, so perhaps there is ultimately no
harm in subjecting it to strict scrutiny. But this response misses
the point. Suppose that the mob boss orders his henchman to commit a less serious offense, such as selling a small quantity of marijuana. It is not obvious that our drug laws could survive strict
scrutiny, because they arguably do more harm than good (in creating a black market, fostering violence, discouraging addiction
treatment, and so forth). There is a potential floodgates problem
here, but even if no flood of litigation would arise from generalizing the HLP approach, there is also a conceptual problem.
Whether the charge is murder or marijuana trafficking, it seems
mistaken to say that the mob boss has even a prima facie free
speech defense.
B. Other Free Speech Analogies
Free speech doctrine provides another potential escape. Perhaps any crime committed via a speech act would fall within the
unprotected category of speech identified in Giboney v Empire
Storage & Ice Co.53As elaborated in United States v Stevens,54that
category consists of "speech integral to criminal conduct."55 Yet
this escape is only partial. It deprives the mob boss of his free
speech defense to criminal charges but leaves him with such a
defense to civil liability if he gives instructions to his henchman
to commit tortious but noncriminal acts. That too does not seem
like an appropriate case for even a prima facie free speech
defense.

336 US 490 (1949).
559 US 460 (2010).
55 Id at 468, citing Giboney, 336 US at 498. See also generally Eugene Volokh, The
"Speech Integral to Criminal Conduct" Exception, 101 Cornell L Rev 981 (2016).
53
54
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At the same time, however, for the sorts of reasons one might
think it plausible to apply Second Amendment scrutiny in some
of the common-law cases Blocher and Miller identify, First
Amendment scrutiny in HLP itself seems right. Nor is the case
unique.
Suppose a state university adopts a rule forbidding students,
staff, and faculty members from storing explicitly sexual computer image files on university-owned servers, even if the images
are not legally obscene. Now suppose the rule is successfully challenged on free speech grounds, so the university changes its policy. It adopts a broader policy forbidding "misuse of university
property" and disciplines students, staff, and faculty members for
storing even nonobscene pornography on the university servers
under the broader policy. Perhaps the image-specific policy
should have been upheld, but if it is invalid on free speech
grounds, it is difficult to see why the application of the more
broadly worded misuse rule would be permissible-even if the
misuse rule were not specifically adopted for the purpose of circumventing free speech limits. After all, the application of the
rule in the particular case is surely targeted at expression, just as
in HLP.
We appear to have a genuine puzzle. Sometimes the application of a general rule or policy to particular conduct that appears
to be the exercise of a right can be fairly characterized as targeted
at the right, while sometimes it cannot or should not be so characterized. How do we know when to draw one rather than the
other conclusion?
C. From Rights to Laws
Blocher and Miller make progress on that question with respect to the Second Amendment by focusing on the various purposes that the Amendment might serve. They offer a rights-side
solution. In so doing, they join good company. Other scholars have
similarly shown how rights do not merely operate as trumps or
shields against any and all laws. For example, Professor Richard
Fallon has shown how facial challenges are much more common
than official doctrine recognizes.56 Professor Matthew Adler has

56 Richard H. Fallon Jr, Fact and Fiction about FacialChallenges, 99 CalL Rev 915,
942-45 (2011).
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demonstrated the pervasiveness of rule dependence in our constitutional law.57 Professor Ashutosh Bhagwat has gone so far as to
characterize the notion of rights as freestanding trumps or shields
as a "myth." 58 Blocher and Miller make an important contribution
to the rights-side literature, but implicitly they also point the way
toward a different path: a law-side solution.
Consider an analogy. For millennia philosophers and, more
recently, neuroscientists have struggled with the mind-body problem: How does insensate matter in the brain give rise to consciousness? Perhaps the inquiry is backwards. It takes the material world as given, in no need of explanation, and consciousness
as mysterious. Yet, as philosopher Colin McGinn notes, we know
what consciousness is because we experience consciousness directly; we are consciousness. Using a distinction drawn by
Bertrand Russell, McGinn says we have "knowledge by acquaintance" with consciousness, rather than the mere "knowledge by description" that we have of the material world. 9 Our perceptionsof
the material world through our senses are knowledge by acquaintance, but our inferences about the material world itself provide indirect, propositional knowledge. Reversed in this way, the
puzzle remains. We still do not know how the brain produces the
mind, and maybe, as McGinn also argues, we can never know,60
but once we turn away from mind and back to the material world,
we realize how little we understand about it. What is the relation
between the laws of nature and nature itself? Do these laws
merely describe the patterns we observe in the material world or
do they in some sense cause the material world to conform to those
laws? If the latter, how? Once we realize how little we understand
about causation in the material world itself, we may see the mindbody problem as merely one of many puzzles about how causation
works in the physical world.
Something similar occurs in the legal literature on rights and
laws. Fallon, Adler, and Bhagwat all think that the core puzzle is
our misunderstanding of what rights are. If only we come to see
that rights generally are, in Adler's phrase, "rule-dependent,"61
we will give up the myth of rights as trumps or shields and come
to see them for what they really are. But in following that course,
57 Matthew D. Adler, Rights againstRules: The Moral Structure of American Constitutional Law, 97 Mich L Rev 1, 3-6 (1998).
58 Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Myth of Rights: The PurposesandLimits of Constitutional
Rights 1-2 (Oxford 2010).
59 Colin McGinn, Consciousness and Its Objects 6 (Clarendon 2004).
60 See id at 12.
61 See Adler, 97 Mich L Rev at 45 (cited in note 57).
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we find only more puzzles, because just as philosophers and neuroscientists mistakenly think that they understand matter and go
looking for mind, so legal scholars mistakenly think that we understand what a law is and go looking for rights. The questions
raised by Blocher and Miller show that we do not understand
what we mean by a law.
Is every enactment of a legislature a discrete law? How about
lines of text in a statute or regulation? Severable subparts of such
text? Severable applications of a text? If so, how do we determine
which applications are severable? Does it matter whether the relevant legal obligation is judge-made? Do the answers to these
sorts of questions vary depending on the nature of the law?
If laws are mysterious, we have something like knowledge by
acquaintance of rights. Although legal rights may be ruledependent or structural, the moral rights they implement are
simpler. To say that you have a moral right to some aspect of liberty means that the government needs a very good reason to limit
that liberty. A similarly simple definition can be given for
equality.
The analogy to the mind-body problem need not be perfect,
however. Perhaps we lack knowledge by acquaintance of rights.
Even so, we are certainly no more confused about the nature of
rights than about the nature of laws. Yet nearly all of the scholarly attention has gone toward further clarifying what rights are.
Blocher and Miller implicitly invite us to pay greater attention to
figuring out what we mean when we say that a law infringes a
right by puzzling over what "a law" might mean.
CONCLUSION

Activists and scholars contesting the meaning of the Second
Amendment argue over a startling number of its twenty-seven
words: "regulated," "Militia," "State," "people," "keep," "bear," and
"Arms." Heller and McDonald sought to resolve most of these debates, but before Professors Blocher and Miller, no one noticed the
potential for contestation over the Second Amendment's final
word: "infringed." When does the application of a gun-neutral law
infringe the right? In that deceptively simple question lurk important future debates over the Second Amendment, the Constitution, and law itself.

